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Therefore, EPA's approval was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
not in accordance with law. The court dismissed the claim with
prejudice.
NRDC's next claim involved ten reservoir TMDLs submitted for
review and approval from the State's Section 303(d) list. EPA accepted
the TMDLs for "informational purposes" only on the basis that the
reservoirs did not exceed critical loads. EPA asserted that because the
reservoirs were not water quality limited, they need not appear on the
Section 303(d) list. NRDC alleged EPA's duty to act on a TMDL
depended solely on whether the State's Section 303(d) list included
the water body. Thus, NRDC argued EPA had breached a mandatory
duty under the CWA to either approve or disapprove the TMDLs. The
court agreed with NRDC and found the CWA unambiguously requires
agency action on any proposed TMDL submitted for review and
approval from a state's Section 303(d) list. The court ordered EPA to
either approve or disapprove these ten proposed TMDLs within thirty
days of the entry ofjudgment.
Finally, NRDC alleged EPA breached its mandatory duty under the
CWA to "oversee and effectuate" New York's Section 303(d) program.
The court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court stated
NRDC must specifically address EPA's failures item by item rather than
simply alleging generally that EPA has poorly administered the TMDL
program.
John A. Helfrich
No Spray Coalition, Inc., v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 5395, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13919 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (holding the
spraying of insecticides in accordance with registered use does not give
rise to a personal action under the Clean Water Act, the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, nor violates the requirements of the
State Environmental Quality Review).
No Spray Coalition ("Coalition") sought to enjoin the City of New
York ("City") from spraying insecticides designed to eradicate
mosquitoes carrying the West Nile Virus. The Coalition asserted the
City's spraying program was ineffective and dangerous to the
community. The court determined that deciding whether the benefits
of the insecticide outweighed the harm caused to the community was
outside its role. The court dismissed all claims that the spraying
program violated federal law. However, the court refused to dismiss
the claim that the City sprayed the insecticide directly over navigable
waters to allow the Coalition to engage in further discovery. The court
also denied the Coalition's application for preliminary injunction.
The court first looked at whether the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") provided a private right to
sue. The court concluded Congress was deliberate in not allowing a
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private remedy. Therefore, FIFRA did not provide a private right to
sue.
The Coalition alleged the spraying program also violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). The Court determined the argument called for a broad
interpretation of the CWA and reasoned that this view was in conflict
with congressional intent. Again, the court pointed out that Congress
intended no private right to sue for these types of violations.
The Coalition argued the unintentional drift of the pesticide
violated the CWA because minuscule particles penetrated the
navigable waters surrounding the City. The court reasoned that EPA
registers pesticides for this type of use because they will not have an
unreasonable effect on the environment. To hold differently would
frustrate the regulatory intent of the CWA. The court further
concluded that a violation of the CWA did not occur simply because
the particles might ultimately end up in the water. To violate the CWA
the insecticide must be discharged into the navigable waters. The City
discharged these pesticides into the air and the CWA's definition of
"discharged" did not include this activity.
Next, the Coalition contended the City sprayed the insecticide
directly over navigable waters in violation of the CWA. The court
concluded the Coalition failed to present evidence that the City
sprayed the pesticide directly over navigable waters, and therefore,
refused to grant an injunction. However, the court denied the City's
motion to dismiss in order to allow the Coalition further discovery.
The Coalition also asserted the spraying program violated RCRA in
that once the City sprayed the pesticide, it became discarded waste.
RCRA states that a substance is not discarded waste until it has served
its purpose. The court concluded spraying the pesticide into the air
did not fit the definition of discarded waste under RCRA.
Finally, the Coalition asked the court to enjoin the spraying
program because the City failed to prepare an environmental impact
statement as required by the State Environmental Quality Review. The
court pointed to an emergency exception to this requirement. The
court held the threat of a mosquito-borne infectious disease
constituted an emergency under this provision.
Lynne Stadjuhar
Technical Rubber Co. v. Buckeye Egg Farm, L.P., No. 2:99-CV-1413,
2000 U.S. Dist. IEXIS 8602 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2000) (holding
federal law did not preempt a landowner's state claims based upon a
neighboring landowner's actions in the same state in which the cause
of action arose).
Technical Rubber Company and other property owners
(collectively, "Plaintiffs") originally filed this suit in the Court of

